Speculative execution attacks, such as Meltdown, Spectre, and Foreshadow, exploit performance optimization features in modern processors and micro-architectural side channels to breach the confidentiality of computer systems. Although few incidences have been reported in the wild, their very existence imperils the promise of strong security isolation of cloud computing. This panel will invite experts from both academia and industry to discuss the impacts of speculative execution attacks on the cloud industry. The aim of the panel is to understand the state of the art of academic research and industry practice, and to explore future academic research directions and industry best practices.
Security is the cornerstone of multi-tenant public clouds. Allowing every cloud customer to have full control of cloud virtual machines (VM), cloud operators have placed the entire cloud infrastructure at risk when the customers perform malicious activities on these VMs. The state-of-the-art defense solely relies on virtualization to thwart attacks from malicious VMs. In the past decade, a line of academic research that studies cross-VM attacks, such as cross-VM micro-architectural side channels [4, 6, 11] , cross-VM Rowhammer attacks [5, 9] , and cross-VM memory denial-of-service attacks [10] , have emerged, providing hackers tools to crack the wall of virtualization.
The recent emergence of speculative execution attacks to some extent have aggravated the threats of malicious VMs in public clouds. Speculative-execution attacks, e.g., Meltdown attacks [3] and Spectre attacks [2] , exploit computer micro-architectural vulnerabilities in modern processors to speculatively execute instructions that steal secrets across security boundaries and transmit them through micro-architectural side channels. To perform these attacks, Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). CCSW'19, November 11, 2019, London, United Kingdom © 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6826-1/19/11. https://doi.org/10.1145/3338466.3360287 however, the adversary is required to have the privilege of executing code on the target machine. Therefore, public clouds where VMs are fully controlled by the customers become a prominent target. While the original vulnerabilities are patched, either in the processor hardware or system software, the root cause-speculative execution in high-performance processors-is not disabled. As a result, new vulnerabilities, like L1TF [1] , Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS) [7, 8] , continue to come forth, invalidating existing defenses that have been applied for previous attacks. These attacks have increased the burden of cloud operators to keep the cloud infrastructure secured against them.
However, cloud computing is here to stay. This panel will invite experts from both academia and industry to discuss the impacts of speculative execution attacks on the cloud industry. The primary aim of the panel is to understand the state of the art of academic research and industry practice. More specifically, how did these attacks affect the cloud industry? How did the cloud operators react to existing attacks and take precaution to tackle future ones? By answering these questions, we hope the panel could serve as a bridge that increases the mutual understanding of both worlds, helping academics to explore future research directions and industry experts to form best practices to cope with these attacks.
